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Abstract: Assuming linear demand and unit transportation cost, Head and Ries 
(2003, ‘Heterogeneity and the FDI versus export decision of Japanese manufacturers’, 
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies) conclude that the theoretical 
prediction of Helpman et al. (2004, ‘Export versus FDI with heterogeneous firms’, 
The American Economic Review), which show that the more productive firms 
undertake FDI and the less productive firms export, does not depend on their 
assumptions of CES preferences and iceberg transportation costs. Considering iceberg 
transportation costs in an otherwise similar setup of Head and Ries (2003), we show 
that the theoretical prediction of Helpman et al. (2004) may not hold. Hence, CES 
preference in Helpman et al. (2004) is important for their theoretical results. 
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A note on firm-productivity and foreign direct investment  
 
1. Introduction 
Dominance of foreign direct investment (FDI) over international trade (UNCTAD, 
2006) has generated a vast theoretical and empirical literature on FDI.
1 
However, the 
literature is paying attention to the effects of firm-productivity on FDI only in recent 
years. Helpman et al. (2004), which consider CES preferences and iceberg 
transportation costs, show that the productivities of the firms undertaking FDI are 
higher than the productivities of the exporters. Head and Ries (2003) use an 
alternative model with a linear market demand function, which is generated by a 
quadratic utility function, and unit transportation cost. In this framework, Head and 
Ries (2003) show that the theoretical prediction of Helman et al. (2004) remains, thus 
concluding that the results of Helpman et al. (2004) do not depend on the CES 
preferences and iceberg transportation costs.
1 
  In this paper, we re-examine the relationship between firm-productivity and 
FDI with iceberg transportation cost in an otherwise similar model of Head and Ries 
(2003). We show that the result of Head and Ries (2003), which confirms the 
theoretical prediction of Helpman et al. (2003), may not hold in this situation. Hence, 
per-unit transportation cost in Head and Ries (2003) is crucial in generating the 
theoretical result of Helpman et al. (2003). Alternatively, it can be said that CES 
preference in Helpman et al. (2004) is important for their theoretical results. 
  More specifically, we show that if the iceberg transportation cost is small, 
higher productivity of a firm may reduce its incentive for FDI. Hence, the prediction 
                                                      
1 Head and Ries (2003) also extend Helpman et al. (2004) to show that less productive firms may do 
FDI in the presences of wage difference between countries, which has not been considered in the latter 
paper. Mukherjee and Marjit (2009) show the implications of labour union on the relationship between 
firm-productivity and FDI.   2
of Head and Ries (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004) do not hold for small iceberg cost.  
Though our contribution is theoreical, it may worth mentioning that the 
empirical evidence on the relationship between firm-productivity and FDI is mixed. 
Helpman et al. (2004), which use a cross-section of the US manufacturing firms, show 
that foreign investors are more productive than the exporters. Using English 
individual data, Girma et al. (2005) broadly confirm the finding of Helpman et al. 
(2004). However, considering listed Japanese firms, Head and Ries (2003) show that 
low productivity firms are most attracted to do FDI in low-cost host countries. Using 
data on Slovenian firms, Damijan et al. (2004) show that, in general, the Slovenian 
firms that invest abroad do not have on average higher labor productivity. They 
support the finding of Helpman et al. (2004), but only for Slovenian FDI in the high-
wage countries. Using the same data set, Damijan et al. (2007) found some support 
that the firms investing in low-income countries have lower average productivity. 
Hence, the negative relationship between productivity and FDI also gets empirical 
support.
2  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and derives the results. Section 3 concludes. 
 
2. The model and the results 
Assume that there is a monopolist foreign firm, which wants to sell a product in a 
country, called the host country. Since the number of sectors is not important for the 
results of Head and Ries (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004), we focus on a single 
sector. We assume that the firm can serve the host country either through export or 
through FDI. If the firm exports, it incurs icberg transportation cost at the rate of t (< 
                                                      
2 Greenaway and Kneller (2003) provide a survey of the recent literature on FDI and firm 
heterogeneity.  
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1). That is, if the firm exports q units of the output, it looses tq units of the output in 
transit and can sell (1 – t)q units of the output. However, the firm incurs a fixed cost F 
under FDI.  
The inverse market demand function for the product is P = a – q, where a > 0, 
P is price and q is the total output.  
We consider that labor is the only factor of production, and it is immobile 
between the countries. Assume that the firm needs λ workers to produce one unit of 
output. Hence, λ is the inverse of labor productivity. A lower λ implies higher labor 
productivity. Since the effects of wage difference have already discused in Head and 
Ries (2003) and Mukherjee and Marjit (2009), we assume that the wages are the same 
in the home and the host countries of the firm, and we normalize the wages in both 
countries to 1. It is needless to say that low wage in the host-country reinforces the 
negative relationship between productivity and FDI shown in this paper. 
We consider the following game. At stage 1, the firm decides whether to 
export or to undertake FDI. At stage 2, production takes place and the profits are 
realized. We solve the game through backward induction.  
  If the firm exports, it determines output by maximizing the following 
expression: 
  ( ( 1) ) ( 1)
q
Max a t q t q q λ −− − − .         ( 1 )  
Expression (1) shows that if the firm produces q units, it can sell (1 – t)q units of 
output and gets the price equal to P = a – (1 – t)q. However, the production cost to the 
firm is  q λ . 
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The equilibrium output is positive if  1 tt
a
λ
< −≡ , where 01 t < < . 















.          ( 3 )  
  On the other hand, if the firm undertakes FDI, it determines output to 
maximize the following expression: 
()
q
Max a q q q F λ −− − .        ( 4 )  
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The equilibrium output is positive for a λ > . 











=− .          ( 6 )  
  It is immediate from (3) and (6) that the firm prefers FDI than export if 
**
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,       ( 7 )  
which shows the maximum gain from FDI compared to export. That is, the firm has 
the incentive for FDI provided the cost of FDI, F, is less than F . Higher value of F  
implies that the firm has higher incentive for FDI. 
 
Proposition 1: (a) If  2 a λ > , higher productivity, i.e., lower λ , increases (reduces) 
the incentive for FDI if 
* (, ) tt t ∈  (








(b) If  2 a λ < , higher productivity increases the incentive for FDI for  (0, ) tt ∈ .   5















* tt < . However, 
* 0 t >  if  2 a λ > . The rest of the proof follows immediately. ■ 
 
  The above result is in contrast to Head and Ries (2003) and Helpman et al. 
(2004) for 
* tt < . 
The intuition for our result is easy to understand once we see the effects of 


















. Hence, whether higher productivity increrases or reduces the firm’s 
incentive for FDI depends on its output under export and under FDI. Higher 
productivity reduces the incentive for FDI if 
**
f x qq < , which occurs if  2 a λ >  and 
* tt < . Otherwise, 
**
f x qq >  and higher productivity increases the incentive for FDI.  
  The firm’s output under FDI does not depend on t, and it is equal to its output 
under export if t = 0. However, if  2 a λ > , as t increases from 0, it initially increrases 
the firm’s output untill t reaches a critical value, and then higher t reduces the firm’s 
output under export. This happens due to two opposing effects. On one hand, higher t 
encourages lower production by increasing wastage. On the other hand, higher t 
reduces the amount sold for a given production, thus increasing the price and 
encourages higher production. The latter effect dominates for small t, while the 
former effect dominates for large t.  
  It must be clear now why our result differs from Head and Ries (2003). The 
unit transportation cost in their work does not create the above-mentioned price effect. 
The equilibrium output of the firm in their analysis is always lower under export 
compared to FDI, and higher productivity always increases the incentive for FDI.    6
 
3. Conclusion 
In an influential paper, Helpman et al. (2004), which consider CES preferences and 
iceberg transportation costs, show that the productivities of the foreign investors are 
higher than the productivities of the exporters. Using linear demand and unit 
transportation cost, Head and Ries (2003) argue that the theoretical results of 
Helpman et al. (2004) do not depend on their assumptions of CES preferences and 
iceberg costs. Considering iceberg transportation cost in an otherwise similar setup of 
Head and Ries (2003), we show that the productivities of the exporters may be higher 
than the foreign investors if the transportation cost is small. Thus, we show that the 
CES preferences in Helpman et al. (2004) play an important role for their theoretical 
results. Hence, more empirical works are required to see the relative productivities of 
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